Assimilation, Enclaves, and Take: How States Might Protect Wildlife on Federal Reservations by Miller, Ben
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL207.txt unknown Seq: 1 27-DEC-07 15:06
NOTE
BEN MILLER*
Assimilation, Enclaves, and Take:
How States Might Protect Wildlife
on Federal Reservations
I. State and Federal Wildlife Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386 R
II. Federal Enclave Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 R
A. Reservation of State or Local Authority . . . . . . . 392 R
B. Residual State and Local Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . 392 R
C. Federal Retrocession of Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . 392 R
D. Explicit Congressional Provision for Specific
State or Local Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 R
III. Nature and Background of the Assimilative Crimes
Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394 R
A. Tests for Assimilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 R
B. Application of the Assimilative Crimes Act . . . 399 R
IV. Jurisdiction of the Assimilative Crimes Act . . . . . . . . 402 R
A. Methods of Obtaining Federal Legislative
Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403 R
B. Legislative History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 R
C. Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 R
V. State Endangered Species Acts as Criminal
Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406 R
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2007.  H.B.S. Fisheries and Wildlife
Management, Oregon State University (2004).  During law school Mr. Miller
worked as a law clerk for both the Oregon Department of Justice, General Counsel
Division, Natural Resources Section and the United States Department of the In-
terior, Office of the Solicitor, Parks and Wildlife Branch.  Needless to say, these
opinions are his own and do not represent his employers.  The author would like to
thank Adell Amos for her early encouragement and editing, and Tom and Pamela
Foggin.  The genesis of this paper occurred one muggy summer afternoon under
their magnolia tree in northeastern Washington, D.C.
[383]
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL207.txt unknown Seq: 2 27-DEC-07 15:06
384 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 22, 383
VI. Assimilation of State Wildlife Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 R
VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412 R
On the broad windswept expanse of the Columbian Steppe
near the town of Boardman, Oregon, a small brown figure
emerges from a tangle of rock and sagebrush.  Light white spots
dot its back in such a way that, even at eight inches, it makes a
striking figure.  This small denizen of the desert is the Washing-
ton ground squirrel, Spermophilus washingtoni , a species found
only within the shrub-steppe habitat of the Columbia Basin
ecosystem of Oregon and Washington.  Agriculture, develop-
ment, and the spread of nonnative grass species threaten the only
soil types used by the squirrels.  The result is a sporadic distribu-
tion, significant fragmentation, and loss of entire colonies.
While it receives no federal protection, the squirrel is listed as
an endangered species by the State of Oregon.1  This particular
squirrel makes its home on a federal enclave: the Boardman Na-
val Weapons Training Facility (Facility).  The Facility has been
described as “[t]he most contiguous, least-disturbed expanse of
suitable Washington ground squirrel habitat within the species’
range.”2  The Facility is also an area of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion—thus the protections of Oregon’s Endangered Species Act
do not directly apply.  In the absence of any federal protection,
there appears to be nothing preventing the Department of De-
fense from converting the squirrel’s last stronghold back to its
original use—a bombing range.3
The Washington ground squirrel is just one of a number of spe-
cies protected by a state but not protected by the federal govern-
1 OR. ADMIN. R. 635-100-0125 (2007). See also  County of Morrow v. Dep’t of
Fish & Wildlife, 37 P.3d 180, 181-83 (Or. App. 2001) (discussing the listing determi-
nation and status of the squirrel).
2 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native Species That
Are Candidates or Proposed for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual No-
tice of Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual Description of Progress on List-
ing Actions, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,756, 53,778 (Sept. 12, 2006) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
3 For instance, there is a current proposal to construct and operate four new live-
fire weapons ranges in the middle of the facility. See OR. MILITARY DEP’T, BOARD-
MAN BOMBING RANGE COMPLEX NEW WEAPONS TRAINING RANGES: DRAFT ENVI-
RONMENTAL ASSESSMENT i (2006), available at http://www.mil.state.or.us/AGI-E/
PublicReview/BBRC_DEA.pdf.  Weapons used on the range would include light
and heavy machine guns, 25-millimeter tank guns, 120-millimeter cannons, and mis-
siles. Id.  at 8.
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ment.4  It should come as no surprise that the best remaining
squirrel habitat is on a military reservation.5  But state efforts to
recover and protect species can be compromised by federal ac-
tions and jurisdiction.  The federal Endangered Species Act6
(ESA) was created, in part, because of unwillingness among
states to preemptively protect species within their borders.7
Meanwhile, federal constitutional clauses have been interpreted
to give Congress the “power to protect wildlife on the public
lands, state law notwithstanding.”8  This jurisdictional agreement
has created a situation where a state wishing to protect a species
can do so against everyone but the federal government.  In such a
situation, there is a real need for states to undertake creative
problem solving.
This Note proposes a novel theory.  Simply put, the take
prohibitions found in many state endangered species acts apply
to federal lands, including military bases and other enclaves, by
function of the Assimilative Crimes Act.  These prohibitions are
incorporated as federal law and as such, are enforceable.  If ac-
cepted, this theory represents a new and innovative way around
traditional supremacy and preemption problems that stop many
state challenges to federal decisions affecting wildlife.
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the interrelationship be-
tween state and federal regulation of wildlife and the constitu-
tional constraints.  Part II provides a primer on federal enclave
law.  Part III discusses the background and application of the As-
similative Crimes Act.  Part IV discusses exclusive and concur-
rent jurisdiction.  Part V discusses state endangered species acts
as criminal laws.  Part VI walks through the assimilation of a
state wildlife law.  Finally, Part VII concludes with some of the
challenges of enforcing state prohibitions.  The goal of this Note
4 See SUSAN GEORGE ET AL., STATE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTS: PAST, PRE-
SENT, AND FUTURE § 3, pt. 2 (1998) (on file with author).
5 Over 300 plants and animals placed on the federal endangered species list are
located on military installations. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-614,
MILITARY TRAINING: DOD LACKS A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO MANAGE EN-
CROACHMENT ON TRAINING RANGES 6 (2002), available at  http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-614.
6 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
7 Endangered Species: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries , 93d Cong. 204-05 (1973) (statement of Hon. Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Sec-
retary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior).
8 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976).
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is not to challenge federal authority over wildlife generally, but
rather, to ensure there are alternatives available if the federal
government is not living up to its stewardship responsibilities.
I
STATE AND FEDERAL WILDLIFE LAW
Recent decisions of the federal courts, Congress, and the Exec-
utive Branch have resulted in reductions in federal authority to
take actions to protect the environment.  This new federal direc-
tion, in turn, has inspired some state and local governments to
take steps to supplement federal environmental protection mea-
sures with their own initiatives.9  While “new federalism” deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have largely resulted in a narrowing
of federal regulatory power,10 at the same time, “courts have
used various doctrines to restrict the scope of state and local au-
thority to control [these same] activities.”11  Examples include in-
validation of state or local environmental regulations because
they violate the dormant Commerce Clause,12 are preempted,13
or amount to takings without just compensation.14
9 Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy , 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 778
(2006).
10 Id.  at 755. See generally  Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, Fed-
eral Environmental Law in the “New” Federalism Era , 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,122
(2000); Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State Liability for Environ-
mental Violations: The U.S. Supreme Court’s “New” Federalism , 29 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,665 (1999).
11 Glicksman, supra  note 9, at 786.
12 See, e.g. , C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394-95
(1994); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 107 (1994);
Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-46 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary
Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992); City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gil-
more, 252 F.3d 316, 336 (4th Cir. 2001); Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d
774, 787 (4th Cir. 1996); Wendover City v. W. Wendover City, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1324,
1331 (D. Utah 2005); Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168,
1184, 1187 (D. Colo. 2001); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 917
F. Supp. 1514, 1522-23 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
13 See, e.g. , Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246
(2004); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-75 (2000); S.D. Mining
Ass’n v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 1998); Se. Fisheries Ass’n v.
Chiles, 979 F.2d 1504, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992); Vietnamese Fishermen Ass’n of Am. v.
Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 816 F. Supp. 1468, 1476 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
14 See, e.g. , Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-31 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 841-42 (1987).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL207.txt unknown Seq: 5 27-DEC-07 15:06
2007] Assimilation, Enclaves, and Take 387
Wildlife in particular are dealt a one-two punch.  On one hand,
the federal government seemingly cannot or will not conserve
some species.  On the other hand, the states may no longer be
allowed to exercise their traditional stewardship role.  This sort
of conflict becomes most apparent in the context of managing
wildlife on federal lands.15 Historically, federal courts were will-
ing to give deference to state authority over wildlife manage-
ment.16  More recent cases have used the Constitution to limit
the role that states play in wildlife management.17
Kleppe v. New Mexico , a prominent Property Clause case, rep-
resented a substantial shift in the way public resources could be
managed.18 Kleppe  involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act which pro-
tected all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public
lands of the United States from capture, branding, harassment,
or death.  New Mexico challenged the statute on the grounds that
it conflicted with traditional doctrines concerning wild animals
and was in excess of Congress’ power under the Property
Clause.19  The Supreme Court held that Congress retained the
power to enact legislation respecting federal lands and necessa-
rily over the wildlife on those lands.20  This power is not the same
as exclusive legislative jurisdiction, so the state was free to en-
force its civil and criminal laws.21  But where state laws conflict
15 E.g. , Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (holding that the Prop-
erty Clause empowers Congress to preempt state law managing feral horses and
burros on the public lands); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 852
(9th Cir. 2002) (state statutes banning certain leghold traps preempted by the ESA);
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
Fish and Wildlife Service’s refusal to permit the state to vaccinate elk on National
Wildlife Refuge to prevent brucellosis did not violate the Tenth Amendment).
16 See  Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948); Lacoste v. Dep’t of Conserva-
tion, 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528 (1896), over-
ruled by  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
17 See Hughes , 441 U.S. at 338-39 (explicitly overturning the state ownership doc-
trine but recognizing a state’s right to the wildlife within its borders); Baldwin v. Fish
& Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 385-86 (1978) (a state’s right to control wildlife
within its borders must yield to the federal government’s proper exercise of its
power).
18 Kleppe , 426 U.S. 529. Kleppe  noted that the Court, in previous cases, had
warned that state powers over wildlife only exist insofar as they are not incompatible
with the federal government. Id.  at 545 (quoting Geer , 161 U.S. at 528; Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)).  Nevertheless, this decision caught many in the
West by surprise.
19 Kleppe , 426 U.S. at 534-35.
20 Id. at 543.
21 Id.
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with federal legislation, the state laws preempt under the
Supremacy Clause.22  Notwithstanding the traditional trustee and
police powers of the state, the federal government clearly pos-
sesses power over wildlife on the public lands simply by virtue of
their situs.23
The Kleppe  authority over wildlife on federal lands has been
strengthened in other recent cases involving national wildlife ref-
uges.  In November of 1997, the State of Wyoming requested
permission from the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS) to vaccinate elk for brucellosis on the National Elk
Refuge (NER) in order to diminish the chance of spreading the
disease from elk on the NER to elk and cattle off the refuge.24
The USFWS rejected the State’s request, claiming there was not
enough information to find the vaccine “safe and effective.”25
Perhaps even more frustrating to the State, the USFWS failed to
propose any alternative plans to quell the spread of the disease.26
Wyoming promptly filed suit in federal district court under the
Tenth Amendment and the Refuge Improvement Act, claiming
that the USFWS interfered with the State’s right to manage wild-
life within the State.27  The district court granted the United
States’ motion to dismiss on all counts, and Wyoming subse-
quently filed an appeal.28  The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part, holding that the Tenth Amendment does not
reserve to the states the right to manage wildlife “regardless of
the circumstances”29 and that the National Wildlife Refuge Sys-
tem Improvement Act (NWRSIA) granted the USFWS author-
ity to determine whether the vaccination of elk on the NER
conflicted with the goals of the NWRSIA.30
22 Id.
23 Id.  at 546.  The Secretary argued that the statute was sustainable under the
Commerce Clause as well, but the Court did not reach the commerce issue because
it found authority under the Property Clause. Id.  at 535 n.6.
24 Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002).
25 Id.  at 1221-22.
26 Wyoming v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222-23 (D. Wyo. 1999) (“The
Court is sorry that this patchwork of federal law gives the Secretary room to play out
his stalling game while doing nothing.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part , 279 F.3d
1214, 1241 (“We are faced with a situation where the program, or lack thereof, by
one sovereign allegedly impairs the meaningful accomplishment of another sover-
eign’s responsibilities.”).
27 Wyoming , 279 F.3d at 1222-23.
28 Id.  at 1223-24.
29 Id.  at 1227.
30 Id.  at 1235.
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In a third recent case, National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis,
a Ninth Circuit panel held that a California statute banning the
use of certain traps to kill or capture certain wildlife was pre-
empted by ESA and the NWRSIA.31  The USFWS was con-
cerned that it would be prevented from trapping foxes that were
preying on endangered shorebirds.32  Because the California stat-
ute did not provide an exception for federal employees protect-
ing endangered species, the court held that ESA preempted the
state statute.33  The court also found that because the National
Wildlife Refuge was federal land, Congress had authority under
the Property Clause to preempt state action.34  Congress pre-
empted the state with respect to wildlife management via the
NWRSIA.35  As such, Kleppe , Wyoming , and Davis  stand for the
proposition that the federal government may assert near-total
control of wildlife on federal reservations.
Those recent court battles occurred at the same time the fed-
eral government made efforts to remove substantive constraints
on its ability to pursue activities potentially harmful to wildlife.
A prominent example was the military’s effort to exempt activi-
ties related to natural security matters from environmental
laws.36  In a fiscal year 2003 appropriations bill, Congress
amended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act37 by directing the Secre-
tary of the Interior, with the concurrence of the Secretary of De-
fense, to issue regulations allowing the “incidental taking” of
migratory birds during “training and operations of the Armed
Forces that relate to combat” and during the testing of military
equipment and weapons.38
31 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 852-54 (9th Cir. 2002).
32 Id.  at 844.
33 Id. at 852-53.
34 Id.  at 854.
35 Id.
36 One such initiative, sponsored by the Pentagon, was the Readiness and Range
Preservation Initiative, which included proposals to amend the Clean Air Act; Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act; Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act; ESA; Marine Mammal Protection Act; and Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act to exempt certain military activities from those laws. See  Ste-
phen Dycus, Osama’s Submarine: National Security and Environmental Protection
After 9/11 , 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1-2 (2005).
37 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006).
38 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L.
No. 107-314, § 315(d), (f)(1), 116 Stat. 2458, 2509-10 (2002) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. III 2003)).
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Congress also resorted to appropriations legislation to water
down the ESA’s application to certain military activities and to
narrow the activities deemed to constitute improper harassment
of animals under the Marine Mammal Protection Act for military
readiness activities.  Section 318 of the National Defense Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 amended section 4(a)(3) of the
ESA to prevent the Secretary of the Interior from designating
Department of Defense land as critical habitat if the land had a
written integrated natural resource management plan under the
Sikes Act.39  It also added “impact on national security” to the
Secretary’s considerations under ESA section 4(b)(2).40  Section
319 changed the Marine Mammal Protection Act’s definition of
“harassment” for military readiness activities41 and added an ex-
emption provision for actions “necessary for national defense.”42
It also authorized increased incidental takings in military readi-
ness activities.43
Currently, military exemptions exist under ESA,44 Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act,45 Clean Water Act,46 Clean Air
Act,47 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.48
Recent federal decisions have resulted in reductions in envi-
ronmental protections.  At the same time, states have been
stymied from stepping up and protecting wildlife, particularly on
federal lands.  Nowhere has this been more obvious than in the
military context.  Exemptions from federal protections combined
with the unique jurisdictional nature of many military reserva-
tions make it particularly difficult for states to protect wildlife
located on these areas.
39 See  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
136, § 318(a)(3), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003) (codifed as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(a)(3)). See also  Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670-670o  (describing the require-
ments of an integrated natural resource management plan).
40 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, § 318(b), 117 Stat. at
1433 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)).
41 Id.  § 319(a), 117 Stat. at 1433 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18)).
42 Id.  § 319(b), 117 Stat. at 1434 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f)).
43 Id.  § 319(c), 117 Stat. at 1434-35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(5)).
44 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j).
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2006).
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006).
47 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b).
48 15 U.S.C. § 2621 (2006).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL207.txt unknown Seq: 9 27-DEC-07 15:06
2007] Assimilation, Enclaves, and Take 391
II
FEDERAL ENCLAVE LAW
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides in rele-
vant part that:
Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o exercise exclusive Leg-
islation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the District of Colum-
bia], and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards and other needful Buildings . . . .49
These reservations, known as federal enclaves, make up around
six percent of the federal land base and may be found scattered
throughout all categories of federal land including some military
bases, post offices, and national parks.50
When the federal government acquires property for the pur-
poses specified in the Federal Enclave Clause and if the state has
consented to federal jurisdiction, the power to legislate within
the enclave rests exclusively with Congress.51  Exclusive federal
legislative powers mean that state or local laws that have not
been adopted directly or impliedly by the United States are not
effective to regulate property or persons on that federal en-
clave,52 even if the state or local laws do not conflict with federal
law or interfere with a federal function.53  Since February 1, 1940,
the United States acquired jurisdiction over federal lands in a
state only through formal acceptance of jurisdiction by the fed-
eral agency or department.54
In four circumstances, however, the exclusive nature of Con-
gress’ jurisdiction over federal enclaves may be limited:
1) If the state, in its consent to federal jurisdiction has re-
served the authority of the state or local government to
legislate;55
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
50 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE
LAW 173 (5th ed. 2002).  Indian reservations are also included as federal enclaves.
This Note will not address application of the ACA or state law on Indian
reservations.
51 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963).
52 S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 562-63 (1946).
53 Paul , 371 U.S. at 263-64; see also Miss. River Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F.2d
929, 937 (5th Cir. 1967).
54 See  40 U.S.C. § 3112 (2006); Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 313-15
(1943).
55 See Paul , 371 U.S. at 264-65.
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2) If certain types of state or local laws existed at the time the
state consented to federal jurisdiction and those laws or their
basic schemes have continued to the current time;56
3) If Congress has retroceded jurisdiction to the state in whole
or in part;57 or
4) If Congress explicitly provided for the applicability of spe-
cific state or local laws.58
A. Reservation of State or Local Authority
Often, states retain jurisdictional rights when they consent to
federal jurisdiction.  These “consent to purchase” statutes typi-
cally only reserve the right to serve civil or criminal process.59
B. Residual State and Local Jurisdiction
Exclusive federal jurisdiction may also be limited by certain
state and local laws existing at the time a state cedes jurisdiction
to the United States.  This is referred to as the doctrine of
residual jurisdiction.60  When exclusive jurisdiction is transferred
from a state to the federal government, the then-existing state
laws that are intended for the protection of private rights and are
not inconsistent with federal use of the enclave become assimi-
lated as federal law until abrogated.61  This process assures that
no area, however small, will be left without a developed legal
system.62  However, the doctrine of residual jurisdiction tradi-
tionally has been limited to the protection of private rights,63 that
is, laws affecting the use, possession, and transfer of property or
designed to secure order and promote health.64
C. Federal Retrocession of Jurisdiction
The United States may also retrocede jurisdiction over a fed-
eral enclave to a state.65  When the land in question is a federal
56 See id.  at 268-69.
57 Thiele v. City of Chi., 145 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ill. 1957).
58 See Paul , 371 U.S. at 263.
59 See, e.g. , OR. REV. STAT. § 272.030 (2005).
60 Miss. River Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F.2d 929, 939 (5th Cir. 1967).
61 Id.
62 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1940).
63 Miss. River Fuel Corp. , 382 F.2d at 939.
64 Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885).
65 Authority to cede back federal legislative jurisdiction exists for the Director of
the National Park Service, 16 U.S.C. § 1a-3 (2006), the Secretary of Agriculture, 7
U.S.C. § 2268 (2006), the Secretary of Defense, 10 U.S.C. § 2683(a) (2006), the Sec-
retary of Commerce, 15 U.S.C. § 1529 (2006), the Secretary of the Interior, 16
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enclave under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, “ei-
ther action or authorization by Congress is essential to retroces-
sion so long as the United States retains the land.”66  Without
retrocession of jurisdiction, the mere inclusion of language in a
lease or license granted for use of federal enclave property does
not retrocede federal jurisdiction over that property to that
state.67  Therefore, the provision in a license that requires com-
pliance with all applicable state and local laws would not by itself
make any particular state or local laws applicable.68
One of the best known retrocessions of federal jurisdiction to
the states is the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA).69  The ACA
makes state law applicable to conduct occurring on lands re-
served or acquired by the federal government as provided by
statute,70 when the act or omission is not punishable by an enact-
ment of Congress, irrespective of when the property became a
federal enclave.71  Prosecutions under this statute do not enforce
state law, but rather assimilate the state law and enforce it as a
federal law adopted by reference.72
D. Explicit Congressional Provision for Specific
State or Local Laws
Congress may also explicitly authorize the application of par-
ticular state or local laws on a federal enclave, but such authori-
zation must be unambiguous.73  For instance, 10 U.S.C.
§ 2671(a)(1) requires that all “hunting, fishing and trapping at
U.S.C. §§ 425k(b), 430g-5, 742m (2006), the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 38 U.S.C.
§ 8112 (2006), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administrator, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2459k (2006). See also  16 U.S.C. § 251l  (2006) (retroceding exclusive and concur-
rent jurisdiction over certain lands to the state of Washington); id. § 403h-17 (Ten-
nessee); id.  § 430uu-3 (Montana); id.  § 460hh-5 (Oklahoma).
66 Thiele v. City of Chi., 145 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ill. 1957).
67 See Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner, 376 U.S. 369, 374 (1964).
68 Host-tenant real estate agreements commonly require compliance with all ap-
plicable federal, state and local laws, ordinances and regulations where the premises
are located. See, e.g. , 3 ALVIN L. ARNOLD & MYRON KOVE, MODERN REAL ES-
TATE PRACTICE FORMS & COMMENTARY § 86:39 (2006).
69 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).
70 “Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise
acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the
same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other need-
ful building.” Id.  § 7(3).
71 Id.  § 13(a).
72 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 266 (1937).
73 See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963).
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[an] installation or facility be in accordance with the fish and
game laws of the state in which it is located.”74  A limited waiver
of authority exists if such laws could result in undesirable conse-
quences for public health or safety on the enclave.75  Similar to
the ACA, violations are punished on the enclave as they would
be in the state.76  The requirement that congressional authoriza-
tion for state regulation of federal installations be “clear and un-
ambiguous” has led the courts to strictly construe the terms of
federal laws that seemingly waive federal sovereignty.77
III
NATURE AND BACKGROUND OF THE
ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT
With an understanding that the general rule on federal en-
claves is that federal jurisdiction is absolute, we now turn to the
exception.
The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) provides in part:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or
hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in [within the spe-
cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States],
or on, above, or below any portion of the territorial sea of the
United States not within the jurisdiction of any State, Com-
monwealth, territory, possession, or district is guilty of any act
or omission which, although not made punishable by any en-
actment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or
omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Posses-
sion, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws
thereof in force at the time of such act or omission, shall be
guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment.78
The special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, in turn, includes:
Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United
States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the
United States by consent of the legislature of the State in
which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine,
arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.79
74 10 U.S.C. § 2671(a)(1) (2006).
75 Id. § 2671(b)(1).
76 Id. § 2671(c).
77 Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Cal. ex rel.  State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
211 (1976).
78 18 U.S.C. § 13(a).
79 Id. § 7(3).
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That is to say, it includes federal enclaves and other reservations
under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United
States.  There will be more discussion on the jurisdictional reach
of the ACA in Part IV below.
The ACA is designed to establish uniformity in a state’s pro-
hibitory laws where such conduct is not made penal by federal
statutes.80  Its “basic purpose is one of borrowing state law to fill
gaps in the federal criminal law that applies on federal en-
claves.”81  But the ACA is not intended to make federal enclaves
subject to the entirety of the criminal law of the state in which
the enclave is located.  It thus makes applicable only those state
criminal laws that make punishable acts or omissions that have
not been made punishable “by any enactment of Congress.”82
Though the ACA does not apply to state offenses that have al-
ready been made punishable under federal law, the ACA never-
theless “promotes the even-handed application of state law to
local conduct that the federal law does not punish and, but for
the site being a federal enclave, would qualify as a local
offense.”83
The ACA assimilates more than the jurisdiction’s criminal laws
existing on the date of the ACA’s enactment.  By referring to
“the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or omission[,]”
the ACA also assimilates future changes in a jurisdiction’s crimi-
nal law as of the date of an alleged criminal act or omission.84
This prospective incorporation of state law has been upheld by
the Supreme Court.85  As previously mentioned, prosecutions
under the ACA do not enforce state law, but rather assimilate
state law and enforce it as a federal law adopted by reference.86
80 United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1977).
81 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998) (citing United States v. Sharp-
nack, 355 U.S. 286, 289 (1958); Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 718-19
(1946); United States v. Press Publ’g Co., 219 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1911); and Franklin v.
United States, 216 U.S. 559, 568 (1910)).
82 18 U.S.C. § 13(a).
83 United States v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
84 David B. Sweet, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of  Assimi-
lative Crimes Act (ACA) (18 U.S.C. § 13 and Similar Predecessor Provisions) Making
Applicable to Federal Enclave Some Criminal Laws of State, Territory, Possession, or
District in Which Enclave Is Located—Supreme Court Cases , 140 L. Ed. 2d 1123, *2a
(2006).
85 Sharpnack , 355 U.S. at 297.
86 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 266 (1937).
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State law is assimilated only when no “enactment of Congress”
covers the conduct.  This distinction is important because a fed-
eral law prohibiting the conduct will prevent the assimilation of
the state law.  For example, if a species were listed under the fed-
eral ESA, it is unlikely that state ESA take prohibitions would be
assimilated.  Provisions of the U.S. Code naturally qualify as en-
actments of Congress.  Because of its universal applicability,
however, the Uniform Code of Military Justice87 is not an “enact-
ment of Congress” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 13.88  Fed-
eral agency regulations, violations of which are made criminal by
statute, have been held to preclude assimilation of state law.89
Regulations enforceable as laws and promulgated pursuant to a
specific congressional delegation “qualify under the exception in
the ACA as acts or omissions ‘made punishable by any enact-
ment of Congress.’”90  Thus, an “enactment of Congress” is
broader than a literal reading might suggest.  A careful search for
“any enactment of Congress” which might preclude assimilation
will require inquiry among various sources of law.
Further, the ACA does not assimilate all laws.  For example,
the ACA does not assimilate the penal provisions of state regula-
tory schemes91 nor does it incorporate state administrative penal-
ties, such as license suspensions.92  The test for determining
whether a state statute can be assimilated is whether the statu-
tory scheme is considered prohibitory rather than regulatory.93
United States v. Marcyes , the lead case on this subject, involved
a challenge to convictions against the operators of a fireworks
stand on an Indian reservation for possessing fireworks in viola-
tion of Washington state law, which was assimilated under the
ACA.94  In upholding the convictions, the Ninth Circuit made an
important distinction between regulatory and prohibitory laws.95
The court noted that a strong argument exists that Congress did
87 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006).
88 United States v. Walker, 552 F.2d 566, 568 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977).
89 United States v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21, 25 (S.D. Fla. 1980). See also  United
States v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.  2000) (finding a federal regulation an
enactment of Congress).
90 Adams , 502 F. Supp. at 25 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 318c (1976)).
91 United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1977).
92 See  United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 1978).
93 Marcyes , 557 F.2d at 1364 (holding that a Washington fireworks law was pro-
hibitory rather than regulatory).
94 Id.  at 1363.
95 Id. at 1364.
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not intend to include the penal provisions of a state regulatory
system within the ACA.96  The court was concerned that a state
could enforce its regulatory system on the federal jurisdiction by
making criminal any failure to comply with those regulations.97
But that argument fails if a statutory scheme is considered pro-
hibitory rather than regulatory.98
In concluding that Washington’s fireworks law was prohibitory
rather than a regulatory law, the court looked primarily at the
intent of the law.99  Because the intent of the law was to prohibit
the general possession or sale of dangerous fireworks, despite
limited exceptions, it was not a licensing law.100  Licensing laws
regulate the described conduct and are used to generate reve-
nues, whereas prohibitory laws are those laws which prohibit
general use and possession.101  Moreover, the court was con-
cerned that allowing prohibited conduct in federal enclaves
would entirely circumvent Washington’s determination that the
possession of fireworks is dangerous to the general welfare of its
citizens.102  Thus, the decision in Marcyes  ensured a uniform app-
lication of Washington’s prohibitory laws to all citizens.103
A. Tests for Assimilation
Early cases argued that the ACA does not assimilate state laws
that are inconsistent with federal policies expressed in federal
statutes.104 Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co.  previously pro-
vided a three-part framework to analyze whether a given state
law may be considered assimilated: First, is the law in conflict
with federal policies as expressed by other acts of Congress or by
valid administrative regulations which have the force of law?105
Second, is the statute or law so designed that it can be







103 Id. at 1364-65.
104 See Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1944); James
Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 103 (1940) (holding that authority of state
laws or their administration may not interfere with the carrying out of a national
purpose).
105 Johnson , 321 U.S. at 389-90.
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adopted?106  Third, does the law make penal the transaction al-
leged to have taken place?107
However, in Lewis v. United States,  the United States Supreme
Court recently established a two-part test for analyzing whether a
particular state criminal law is properly incorporated into federal
law under the ACA.108  The first part of the test is whether the
“act or omission . . . [is] made punishable by any enactment of
Congress.”109  If not, then the ACA presumably will assimilate
the state statute.110  If some federal enactment does punish the
specified conduct, the second part of the test is whether the fed-
eral enactment that applies to the “act or omission” would pre-
clude application of the state law in question.111 Lewis  teaches
that the primary inquiry in deciding whether the ACA assimilates
a state statute is “one of legislative intent: Does applicable fed-
eral law indicate an intent to punish conduct such as the defen-
dant’s to the exclusion of the particular state statute at issue?”112
The state statute will not be assimilated if, for example: (1) its
application would conflict with federal policy;113 (2) it would ef-
fectively rewrite an offense definition that Congress carefully
considered;114 or (3) the federal statutes reveal an intent to oc-
cupy so much of a field as to exclude use of the particular state
statute.115
While there is no general test to answer this second prong, it
seems fairly obvious that the ACA will not apply where both
state and federal statutes seek to punish approximately the same
wrongful behavior—where, for example, differences among ele-
ments of the crimes reflect jurisdictional or other technical con-
siderations, or where differences amount only to those of name,
definitional language, or punishment.116  Where both state and
106 Id. at 389.
107 Id. at 390.
108 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164 (1998); see also  United States v.
Souza, 392 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2004).




112 Id.  at 166.
113 Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1944).
114 Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 718 (1946).
115 Id.  at 724.
116 Lewis , 523 U.S. at 165 (citing United States v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21, 25
(S.D. Fla. 1980)).
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federal statutes seek to punish approximately the same wrongful
behavior, it seems the ACA will not apply.117
Because there is no gap to be filled in the federal enclave law
by the state statute in such a case, the intent to exclude applica-
tion of state law is obvious, and the state law is not assimilated.118
It is worth noting that a split exists among the circuits as to
whether a court looks to state or federal law in interpreting an
assimilated statute.119  Some circuits have held that, when look-
ing at assimilated statutes, they are not bound by state court in-
terpretations but rather are free to interpret the statute as if they
were interpreting any federal statute.120  Other circuits incorpor-
ate the entire substantive criminal law of the state, including laws
related to the definition and scope of an offense.121  Like so
many other elements in this body of law, deciding which law ap-
plies will require site-specific analysis.
B. Application of the Assimilative Crimes Act
The ACA has been used to prosecute a host of criminal activi-
ties: purposefully pointing a pistol,122 reckless assault,123 bat-
tery,124 burglary,125 disorderly conduct,126 driving while
intoxicated,127 embezzlement,128 firearm possession,129 for-
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Even within circuits there are varying levels of deference to state law.  For
example, the Tenth Circuit does not apply state law prescribing parole terms when
sentencing a defendant convicted under the ACA, United States v. Pinto , 755 F.2d
150, 154 (10th Cir. 1985), but does not apply federal special assessments as they
would be contrary to the ACA principle of conformity to state criminal law. United
States v. Mayberry, 774 F.2d 1018, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977)).
120 See, e.g. , United States v. White, 145 F. App’x 786, 789 (3d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Kiliz, 694 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Johnson v. Yellow Cab
Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 391 (1944)).
121 See, e.g. , United States v. Pierce, 75 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 1996); United
States v. King, 824 F.2d 313, 315 (4th Cir. 1987).
122 United States v. Kaufman, 862 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1988).
123 United States v. Griffith, 864 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1988).
124 United States v. Guardia, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D.N.M. 1998).
125 United States v. Vaughan, 682 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. John-
son, 426 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970).
126 United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jones,
244 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
127 United States v. Doyle, 237 F.3d 950 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Fox, 60
F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Palmer, 956 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Clark, 361 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2005); United States v. Fulker-
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gery,130 gambling law violations,131 kidnapping,132 sodomy,133
reckless driving,134 speeding,135 uttering bad checks,136 horse-
stealing,137 attempted extortion,138 vehicular battery,139 first-de-
gree wanton endangerment,140 drug possession,141 unauthorized
practice of law,142 and eluding police.143  In the wildlife arena, the
statute has been used to prosecute game violations on federal
reserves generally144 and specifically, game violations on military
reservations.145
In addition to being used as a sword by federal prosecutors,
the ACA has been used as a shield in civil litigation.  In Nash v.
Air Terminal Services, Inc.,  a black woman sought damage from
a concessionaire because she was refused service in the dining
room and coffee shop at Washington National Airport (a federal
enclave).146  At that time, Virginia statutorily mandated segrega-
tion in public places, and thus, the ACA applied the law as a
federal crime just as it would have been a state crime in Vir-
ginia.147  The court concluded that on the date of the events, seg-
regation was a mandatory requirement of the federal law
prevailing on the airport, by virtue of the ACA, and the defen-
son, 631 F. Supp. 319 (D. Haw. 1986); United States v. Barner, 195 F. Supp. 103
(N.D. Cal. 1961).
128 United States v. Armata, 193 F. Supp. 624 (D. Mass. 1961).
129 United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
130 United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1971).
131 United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950); United States v. Dakota,
796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986).
132 United States v. Picotte,  30 C.M.R. 196 (1961); United States v. Harkcom, 30
C.M.R. 257 (1961).
133 United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brewer,
363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff’d without opinion , 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973).
134 United States v. Watson, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Va. 1948).
135 United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957).
136 United States v. Frazier, 444 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971); Owens v. United States,
383 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa. 1974), aff’d without opinion , 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975).
137 United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894).
138 United States v. Teplin, 775 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1985).
139 United States v. Allard, 164 F.3d 1146 (8th Cir. 1999).
140 United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2000).
141 United States v. Broadnax, 688 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1988); United States v.
Chapman, 321 F. Supp. 767 (E.D. Va. 1971).
142 United States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 1999).
143 United States v. Kline, 15 M.J. 805 (1983).
144 See  United States v. Dowden, 139 F. Supp. 781 (D. La. 1956).
145 See United States v. Fishel, 12 M.J. 602 (1981).
146 Nash v. Air Terminal Servs., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545, 547 (E.D. Va. 1949).
147 Id.  at 547-48.
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dant’s failure to enforce segregation would have subjected it to
the penalties of the ACA.148
However, not all uses of the ACA in civil litigation have been
successful.  In a pre-Lewis  case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a dis-
missal in an action for damages under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).149  The dispute concerned a plaintiff who dove off
of a bridge in a national park and was rendered a quadriplegic.150
The plaintiff argued “that the government was required to com-
ply with the California River Resort Act,” which was incorpo-
rated pursuant to the ACA.151  The River Resort Act would have
required sounding of the river, a warning sign, and safety
ropes.152  This incorporation, “in turn, established a mandatory
duty under federal law for the [National Park Service] to comply
with . . . for purposes of the FTCA.”153  The court rejected the
argument on four independent bases.  First, the ACA does not
constitute a waiver of federal sovereign immunity, subjecting the
United States to prosecution for violations of state criminal stat-
utes.154  Second, application of the California statute “would vio-
late the Supremacy Clause by constituting a direct and intrusive
regulation by the State of the Federal Government’s operation of
its property.”155  Third, the requirements of the state statute
“would do violence to the main purposes and objectives underly-
ing the National Park System” by “destroy[ing] the visual beauty
and riparian environment of the park . . . .  Finally, the Resort
Act conflict[ed] with federal policy and therefore [could not] be
incorporated into federal law pursuant to the ACA.”156
148 Id.  at 548.  Note that these events ended up with a much happier ending:  fol-
lowing promulgation of a prohibition on segregation by the Administer of Civil
Aeronautics, the court refused to enjoin enforcement of the regulation and explicitly
denied the ACA defense.  Air Terminal Servs., Inc. v. Rentzel, 81 F. Supp. 611, 612
(E.D. Va. 1949).  The court found that “[t]he fundamental purpose of the [ACA] was
to provide each [f]ederal reservation a criminal code for its local government,” but
not “to override other ‘federal policies as expressed by Acts of Congress’ or by valid
administrative orders.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S.
384, 390 (1944)).
149 Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1996).
150 Id.
151 Id.  at 1435.
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IV
JURISDICTION OF THE ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT
Determining which law applies to federal enclaves (state, fed-
eral, or some combination thereof) continues to be a chal-
lenge.157  This challenge arises, in large part, because the law of
federal enclaves depends heavily on how, and when, the federal
government received jurisdiction.158
In general, three types of jurisdiction exist on federal land: ex-
clusive, concurrent, and partial.159  “Exclusive jurisdiction” is the
same as “exclusive legislation,” at least as that term is used in the
federal enclave clause.160  Care should be taken not to confuse
legislative jurisdiction with a proprietary interest from which the
government exercises independent authority under the Property
Clause to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”161
“Exclusive legislative jurisdiction” exists in situations wherein
the federal government has received, by consent of purchase, ces-
sion, or reservation, all the authority of the state, with no reser-
vation made to the state “except the right to serve process
resulting from activities . . . which occurred off the land.”162  The
term “concurrent legislative jurisdiction” applies to those in-
stances where, in granting the United States authority that would
otherwise amount to exclusive legislative jurisdiction over an
area, the state reserves to itself the right to exercise, concurrently
with the United States, all of the same authority.163  Finally, the
term “partial legislative jurisdiction” applies when the federal
government has been granted some legislative jurisdiction over
157 Major Stephen E. Castlen & Lieutenant Colonel Gregory O. Block, Exclusive
Federal Legislative Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It! , 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1997).
158 Id.  at 116.
159 Id.
160 Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652 (1930).
161 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  State attempts to regulate activities on federal
land frequently come afoul of this clause and the related Supremacy Clause, id. art.
VI, cl. 2.  Assimilation seems to provide one way around these constitutional hurdles
since state law becomes federal law and preemption doctrines are thusly
inapplicable.
162 Castlen & Block, supra  note 157, at 116. See also INTERDEPARTMENTAL COM-
MITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE
STATES pt. II, 11 (1957), available at http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/fedjur/fedjur2.
htm.
163 Castlen & Block, supra  note 157, at 117.
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an area in a state, but where the state reserves the right to exer-
cise authority beyond the right to serve civil or criminal process
in the area.164
A. Methods of Obtaining Federal Legislative Jurisdiction
The United States may “retain or acquire legislative jurisdic-
tion over property within a state by (1) reserving it upon granting
statehood; (2) purchase with consent of the state; or (3) ces-
sion.”165 First, legislative jurisdiction may be reserved upon
statehood.  When a state is admitted to the Union, it obtains leg-
islative jurisdiction over all land except land the federal govern-
ment expressly reserves.166  The government is allowed to
reserve or retain jurisdiction over particular sections of land.167
Second, property may be purchased with the state’s consent.
“The power of the [f]ederal [g]overnment to acquire land within
a [s]tate by purchase or by condemnation without the consent of
the [s]tate is well established.”168  However, without the state’s
“consent,” the United States does not gain legislative jurisdic-
tion.169  Consent often takes the form of a “consent to purchase”
statute.  Since 1940, Congress has required the United States to
assent to the transfer of jurisdiction over the property, however it
may be acquired.170  Prior to 1940, the presumption was that the
United States consented to legislative jurisdiction whenever it
was offered.171  Finally, a state may cede legislative jurisdiction
over a parcel of property some time after purchase.172
For this Note’s purpose, special maritime and territorial juris-
diction is limited to that found in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).173  Recent
federal court cases seem to have confused the reach of this juris-
164 Id.
165 United States v. McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
166 See Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526 (1885).
167 Castlen & Block, supra  note 157, at 117-18.
168 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963) (citing Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367, 371 (1875)).
169 See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1937).
170 40 U.S.C. § 3112 (2006).
171 United States v. McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 n.5 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
172 Castlen & Block, supra note 157, at 117.
173 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (2006).  This provision also affords jurisdiction over, among
other places, the high seas, registered vessels on the Great Lakes, and islands con-
taining deposits of guano. Id. § 7.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL207.txt unknown Seq: 22 27-DEC-07 15:06
404 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 22, 383
dictional statute, so a brief history of the development of § 7(3)
might be helpful.174
B. Legislative History
Although § 7(3) in its present form dates to 1940, the statute
can be traced back to several provisions of an act passed by the
First Congress titled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States” (1790 Act).175  The 1790 Act
did not establish a distinct jurisdictional provision but rather in-
corporated jurisdictional limits separately into the substantive
definition of each offense.176  The jurisdictional language of the
1790 Act was clearly based on Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of
the United States Constitution.177
The 1790 antecedent of § 7(3) was codified and slightly
amended in 1874178 but remained substantially in effect until
1909, when the 60th Congress passed “An Act to Codify, Revise,
and Amend the Penal Laws of the United States” (1909 Act).179
The section defining jurisdiction differed only slightly from the
present § 7(3) and provided that admiralty and maritime as well
as the territorial jurisdiction of the United States included
any lands reserved or acquired for the exclusive use of the
United States, and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, or
any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United
174 There appears to be some confusion or general ignorance over the reach of
§ 7(3).  Federal courts have increasingly applied jurisdiction to all federal lands with-
out attempting to determine whether exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction exists. See,
e.g. , United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding ACA charge
on unreserved Bureau of Land Management land); United States v. Verlin, No. 97-
40038-01-SAC, 1997 WL 630110, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1997, revised Oct. 16, 1997)
(agreeing with the government’s contention that lands acquired by the United States
for public use fall within the jurisdiction of the United States); but see United States
v. Grant, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (D. Mont. 2004) (distinguishing wildfire-sup-
pression jurisdiction from criminal jurisdiction); United States v. King, 781 F. Supp.
315, 317 (D.N.J. 1991) (dismissing action for failure to establish federal criminal
jurisdiction).
175 An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9,
1 Stat. 112 (1790) [hereinafter 1790 Act].
176 United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 216 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 1790 Act,
§ 3) (“[S]ection 3 of the 1790 Act provided ‘that if any person . . . shall, within any
fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country, under
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States , commit the crime of wilful
murder, such person . . . shall suffer death.’”) (emphasis in original).
177 Id.  at 216 n.12.
178 See  1873-74 Rev. Stat. § 5391 (1878).
179 An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the Penal Laws of the United States,
§ 272, 35 Stat. 1088, 1143 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Act].
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States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the
same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal,
dock-yard, or other needful building.180
The 1909 Act was not altered by Congress until 1940, when the
76th Congress amended the 1909 Act and enacted what is now
§ 7(3).181  In doing so, Congress made two important changes.
First, Congress deleted the word “exclusive” from the first
phrase; therefore jurisdiction no longer requires that lands be re-
served or acquired “for the exclusive use” of the United
States.182  Second, Congress inserted the words “or concurrent”
between “exclusive” and “jurisdiction” in the second phrase, so
that jurisdiction now extends to “any lands reserved or acquired
for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or con-
current  jurisdiction thereof.”183  The purpose of the changes
seems to have been a response to James v. Dravo Contracting
Co.  where the Supreme Court held for the first time that a state
could retain concurrent jurisdiction over lands acquired by the
United States with the consent of the state pursuant to Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution.184
C. Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)
The modern version of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) can be best understood
if it is broken down into two parts.  The first part provides juris-
diction over “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the
United States, and  under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction
thereof.”185  The first part of § 7(3) applies to lands generally, as
distinct from “places ‘for the erection of a . . . building.’”186  Fur-
ther, those lands must be “reserved or acquired” by the United
States.187  This may be done without  the consent of the state leg-
islature in the event the federal government reserves jurisdiction
before statehood.188  Otherwise, this first portion of § 7(3) can
180 1909 Act, ch. 321, § 272, 35 Stat. at 1143.
181 See  Act of June 11, 1940, ch. 323, 54 Stat. 304 (1940).
182 Id.
183 Id.  (emphasis added).
184 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148-49 (1937).
185 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
186 Jordan J. Paust, Non-Extraterritoriality of “Special Territorial Jurisdiction” of
the United States: Forgotten History and the Errors of Erdos , 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 305,
318 (1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1994)).
187 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).
188 See supra Part IV.a (discussing methods of obtaining federal legislative
jurisdiction).
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only reach additional “lands” subject to exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction of the United States via “consent to purchase” or
state cession.189
The second part applies to alternative lands which encompass
“any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States
by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall
be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or
other needful building.”190  If the United States acquires land
within the borders of the state with the consent of the state legis-
lature “by purchase or condemnation for any of the purposes
mentioned in Art[icle] I, [Section] 8, [Clause] 17, or if the land is
acquired without such consent and later the state gives its con-
sent, the jurisdiction of the [f]ederal [g]overnment becomes ex-
clusive.”191  A state may condition its consent upon its retention
of jurisdiction over the lands consistent with the federal use.192
In any event, acquisition with consent for the purposes enumer-
ated above is sufficient to gain special territorial jurisdiction re-
gardless of what jurisdiction is retained by the state (i.e. partial
jurisdiction as opposed to exclusive).
V
STATE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTS
AS CRIMINAL LAWS
Forty-five states have some version of their own Endangered
Species Act.193  The lists provided in those acts include many
more species than those listed federally and prescribe a multi-
tude of proscriptions for their protections.  Often they include
native species listed by the federal government up to the date of
the state enactment.194  Commonly, states will determine the ad-
dition of subsequent species on a case-by-case basis.195
189 Id.
190 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).
191 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963) (internal quotations omitted).
192 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 146-49 (1937).
193 GEORGE ET AL., supra  note 4, at § 3 pt. 2.
194 E.g. , OR. REV. STAT. § 496.176(1) (2005) (“The lists of threatened species or
endangered species established pursuant to [section 496.172(2)] shall include: (a)
[t]hose species of wildlife listed as of May 15, 1987, as a threatened species or an
endangered species pursuant to the federal Endangered Species Act . . . .”).
195 E.g. , KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-960(a) (2006) (enumerating a series of factors to
consider when deciding whether to list species).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-2\OEL207.txt unknown Seq: 25 27-DEC-07 15:06
2007] Assimilation, Enclaves, and Take 407
Much has already been written about the role of state endan-
gered species acts, their history, shortcomings, and possible fu-
ture.196  However, this section will only try to address a common
element inherent to all state endangered species acts: prohibi-
tions and their application as criminal law.
Generally speaking, there are two categories of prohibitions:
those that prohibit trade197 and those that prohibit harming a
listed species.198  The term “take” itself varies a great deal from
state to state.  It may encompass harassment,199 or be limited to
harvest and capture.200  Some states follow the federal definition
of take, which is to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.”201  However, only one state includes “habitat modifica-
tion” as a take,202 similar to what is found in the regulatory defi-
nition of harm under the federal ESA.203  Consultation and
196 See, e.g. , Kevin Cassidy, Endangered Species’ Slippery Slope Back to the States:
Existing Regulatory Mechanisms and Ongoing Conservation Efforts Under the En-
dangered Species Act , 32 ENVTL. L. 175 (2002); Dale D. Goble et al., Local and
National Protection of Endangered Species: An Assessment , 2 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y
43 (1999); GEORGE ET AL., supra note 4.
197 E.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 601 (2007). (“Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of this title, the importation, transportation, possession or sale of any endan-
gered species of fish or wildlife, or hides or other parts thereof, or the sale or
possession with intent to sell any article made in whole or in part from the skin, hide
or other parts of any endangered species of fish or wildlife is prohibited, except
under license or permit from the Division of Fish and Wildlife.”)
198 The Indiana Code prohibits “take” of listed species. IND. CODE § 14-22-34-12
(2007).  Take is defined as to “harass, hunt, capture, or kill; or . . . attempt to harass,
hunt, capture, or kill; wildlife.” Id. § 14-22-34-5.
199 E.g. , HAW. REV. STAT. § 195D-2 (2006) (defining take as “to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect endangered or threatened
species of aquatic life or wildlife, or to cut, collect, uproot, destroy, injure, or possess
endangered or threatened species of aquatic life or land plants, or to attempt to
engage in any such conduct”).
200 E.g. , ALASKA STAT. § 16.20.195 (2006) (“A species or subspecies of fish or
wildlife listed as endangered under [section] 16.20.190(b) may not be harvested, cap-
tured, or propagated except under the terms of a special permit issued by the com-
missioner of fish and game for scientific or educational purposes, or for propagation
in captivity for the purpose of preservation.”).
201 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006); see, e.g. , MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 10-2A-
01(k) (2007) (mirroring federal definition).
202 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131A, § 1 (2007) (defining take to include activi-
ties which “disrupt the nesting, breeding, feeding or migratory activity” of listed
species).
203 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006) (harm in the definition of take may include the “signifi-
cant[ ] impair[ment of] essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering”).
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familiarity with specific ESA provisions in a particular state are
paramount to understanding which activities may be prohibited.
Further, state ESAs are not universal in their application.
Some only impose certain requirements on state agencies204 or
expressly prohibit application outside of public lands.205
One of the most important questions to ask is who do the take
prohibitions apply to?  Most often, this is resolved by looking to
the statutes that define “person.”  Under the federal ESA, a per-
son includes a litany of subjects which essentially exhausts who
could be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.206  State
definitions are not always so inclusive.  For instance, under the
Oregon ESA, a “person” means a “natural person, individual,
corporation, company, society, association, firm, partnership, co-
operative, governmental or political subdivision or agency
thereof”;207 whereas, under Vermont law, a person only includes
a “principal, agent, employee, firm, partnership, corporation, and
association” for purposes of its state ESA.208  However, criminal
provisions in wildlife protection laws have been applied to offi-
cials responsible for agency action.209  Again, a state-specific in-
quiry will be necessary to see to whom any given state ESA
applies.
Regardless of how one categorizes them, game laws are crimi-
nal laws.210  As such they bring up traditional issues of criminal
intent.  For instance, the State of Oregon has decided that misde-
meanor and felony violations of fish and game law require dem-
onstration of a “culpable mental state.”211  Thus, it may not be
enough to simply show that a taking occurred.  In order to im-
pose criminal punishment, the appropriate mental state will also
have to be shown.  Without strict liability for a taking, an under-
204 E.g. , OR. REV. STAT. § 496.182(8) (2005) (determining how state land manag-
ing agencies contribute to the conservation of a listed species).
205 E.g. , GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132(b) (2007) (“rules and regulations [protecting
species] shall not affect rights in private property or in public or private streams, nor
shall such rules and regulations impede construction of any nature”).
206 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
207 OR. ADMIN. R. 635-100-0100(9) (2007).
208 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4001(18) (2005).
209 See, e.g. , United States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234, 1242-44 (8th Cir. 1987).
210 DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 805 (2002); see also State v. Chang Hwan Cho, 681 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Or. 1984)
(wildlife offenses in Oregon are governed by the Oregon Criminal Code).
211 Cho , 681 P.2d at 1157; State v. Holt, 681 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Or. 1984) (citing
Cho , 681 P.2d at 1157); but see State v. Miller, 788 P.2d 974, 978, 984 (Or. 1990)
(concurring and dissenting opinions suggesting that Cho  was wrongly decided).
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standing of state criminal law will prove critical when applying an
assimilated take statute.
Federal agencies have taken some notice of state ESAs.  In a
recent decision, the Interior Board of Land Appeals (Board) up-
held a stipulation placing operational and timing restrictions on a
mining authorization in order to protect a state-listed species.212
In a challenge to its decision, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) contended that failing to respect burrowing owl habitat
would result in a prohibited take and that the species must be
accorded habitat protection by virtue of internal policy.213  That
internal policy provides that “state laws protecting [state listed]
species will apply to all BLM programs and actions to the extent
that they are consistent with the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act and other [f]ederal laws.”214  The Board upheld the
BLM’s discretion to apply the restrictions despite the fact that
Colorado’s take prohibitions did not require it.215
Reliance on discretionary action or action that goes beyond
state requirements is not enough.  A state would not likely be
able to successfully prosecute a federal agent for violating state
law in carrying out an activity authorized by the federal govern-
ment.216  Thus, there continues to be a need for some hook to
ensure that state endangered species take prohibitions are uni-
formly enforced.
212 Moffat County Rd. Dep’t, 158 I.B.L.A. 221, 231 (2003).
213 Id.  at 225.
214 U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NO. 6840, SPECIAL STATUS SPECIES MANAGE-
MENT, § 6840.11(D) (2001), available at  http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/manual/
6840.pdf.
215 Moffat County , 158 I.B.L.A. at 229. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-102(43)
(2006) (defining take as “to acquire possession of wildlife; but such term shall not
include the accidental wounding or killing of wildlife by a motor vehicle, vessel, or
train”).  Colorado’s prohibition is one on trade generally, and not the broader take
definition found in the federal ESA. See supra notes 197-198, 200 and accompany-
ing text.
216 See Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. de-
nied , 127 S. Ct. 553 (2006) (barring state prosecution of federal agents for trespass
because Supremacy Clause immunity extends to criminal liability of federal officials
for alleged violations of state law committed in the course of their federal duties).
See also  Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890); Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d
359, 377 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), vacated as moot,  266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc); In re McShane, 235 F. Supp. 262, 275 (N.D. Miss. 1964).
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VI
ASSIMILATION OF STATE WILDLIFE LAWS
Lewis teaches us that the first inquiry to make when deciding
whether a given law is assimilated is to ask if the defendant’s “act
or omission . . . [is] made punishable by any enactment of Con-
gress.”217  A negative answer completes the inquiry; the ACA
will presumably assimilate the statute.218  Depending on the par-
ticular circumstances, numerous acts that protect wildlife could
be considered in determining whether a state prohibition is as-
similated.  These include the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981,219
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918,220 Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act,221 federal ESA,222 Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972,223 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act,224
and other federal agency statutes and regulations.225
Even if the take of a species is protected by one of these laws,
the question remains whether the federal statutes that apply to
the act or omission preclude application of the state law in ques-
tion.  Assimilation may be precluded because: (1) its application
would interfere with the achievement of a federal policy; (2) the
state law would effectively rewrite an offense definition that
Congress carefully considered; and (3) the federal statutes reveal
an intent to occupy so much of a field as would exclude use of the
particular state statute at issue.
For example, if a species were protected under the federal
ESA, it might still be appropriate to assimilate state take protec-
tions.  While it is true that the assimilation could be precluded
because ESA preempts the field or assimilation would rewrite
the federal “take” definition, it would not necessarily interfere
217 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164 (1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 7(3)
(1994) (emphasis in original)).
218 Id.  Despite careful searching this author has not been able to find any post-
Lewis  cases where there was no enactment of Congress and the law still was not
assimilated.
219 Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2006).
220 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006).
221 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2006).
222 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
223 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1423h (2006).
224 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (Wild Horses Act) 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340 (2006).
225 E.g. , 36 C.F.R. § 2.2(a)(1) (2006) (prohibition on taking wildlife in national
parks); 50 C.F.R. § 70.4(c) (2006) (prohibition on killing wildlife at national fish
hatcheries).
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with federal policy.  The federal ESA itself provides opportuni-
ties for states to participate in the process of protecting endan-
gered or threatened species.  First, ESA specifically mandates
that the Secretary of the Interior, in implementing the statute,
“cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the
[s]tates.”226  Second, it authorizes the Secretary to enter into
agreements with states for the administration and management
of any area established for the conservation of listed species and
to enter cooperative agreements to establish and maintain “ade-
quate and active” programs for such conservation.227  Finally,
while ESA invalidates state laws and regulations aimed at certain
conduct, it specifically reserves to states the authority to adopt
laws or regulations that are otherwise intended to conserve fish
or wildlife, and to adopt laws regulating the taking of listed spe-
cies that are more restrictive than ESA’s provisions.228
Applying this test to the squirrel mentioned in the introduction
of this article, the Boardman Naval Weapons Training Facility is
a federal enclave.  The land was largely acquired between 1941
and 1943.229  Sometime between 1942 and 1945, the federal gov-
ernment accepted exclusive jurisdiction over all lands acquired
by it for military purposes within the State of Oregon.230  Thus,
the Facility is an area of exclusive legislative jurisdiction and so
the ACA will apply.
226 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (2006).  For a discussion of cooperative federalism under
the ESA, see Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation
from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endan-
gered Species Act , 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45 (2002). See also  Robert L. Fischman,
Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species Act , 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 463
(2004) (concluding that “cooperative programs are bound to play an increasingly
important role in ESA implementation in the near future”).
227 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b)-(c).
228 Id. § 1535(f).
229 See  GlobalSecurity.Org, Military: Boardman Range, http://www.global
security.org/military/facility/boardman.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2004).  In the two
years following a 1941 directive the Department of War, now the Department of
Defense, acquired 58,662.90 acres of fee; 37,320.31 acres of public domain lands; and
an easement for 2.30 acres—95,985.51 acres in total. Id.  A November 22, 1960,
transfer by the Air Force “divided the range into a checkerboard pattern that was
not conducive for use as a modern bombing range.” Id. Several years of negotiaton
with the State of Oregon led to a decision to divide the former range in two. Id.
“The Navy consolidated its operation on the eastern 47,722.07-acre half . . . and
currently uses 37,320.31 acres of the public domain lands.” Id.
230 22 Op. Or. Att’y Gen. 324 (1945).
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Second, we find that the species is listed as endangered by the
State of Oregon and that the state prohibits take231 which is “to
kill or obtain possession or control of any wildlife.”232  Under the
Marcyes  test, this law is prohibitory because the law is designed
not to generate revenue or regulate the conduct of a trade or
business, but to prohibit an action.  The law applies to all per-
sons, which includes a “natural person, individual, corporation,
company, society, association, firm, partnership, cooperative,
governmental or political subdivision or agency thereof.”233
Thus, the take prohibition applies to both individuals and gov-
ernment agencies.  A knowing violation of the take prohibition is
a Class A misdemeanor.234  If a person acts “with an awareness
that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that
a circumstance so described exists,”235 the person could be sent
to prison for up to one year.236
Third, we apply the Lewis  test.  Examining whether any enact-
ment of Congress punishes the conduct, the species is not af-
forded protection under ESA, Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
Marine Mammal Protection Act, Bald and Golden Eagle Protec-
tion Act, or any other federal statute.  The Department of De-
fense has not promulgated any regulations, as defined by the
state statute, which would prohibit take of the squirrel.  The only
regulations close to prohibiting take require that hunting wildlife
be in accordance with state game laws.237  But, because the take
prohibition punishes killing squirrels and not simply hunting
them, it does not punish the same conduct.  Thus, no enactment
of Congress punishes the conduct, and so Oregon’s take prohibi-
tion would presumably be assimilated.
VII
CONCLUSION
In Parts V through VI, this Note showed how state ESA take
prohibitions are criminal laws and may be assimilated into fed-
eral law through the ACA.  But, barring some upstanding federal
231 OR. REV. STAT. § 498.026(1) (2005).
232 Id. § 496.004(16).
233 OR. ADMIN. R. 635-100-0100(9) (2007).
234 OR. REV. STAT. § 496.992(1).
235 Id. § 161.085(8).
236 Id. § 161.615(1).
237 See 10 U.S.C. § 2671(a)(1) (2006).
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prosecutor who is willing to prosecute federal employees for vio-
lations of state statutes, what options are there to enforce a state
ESA?  Without some private group or state acting as a private
attorney general, it seems likely that the federal government
would do nothing to prevent these take violations from
occurring.
The ACA itself does not constitute a waiver of federal sover-
eign immunity, subjecting the United States to prosecution for
violations of state criminal statutes.238  Therefore, litigants must
look for another source as a waiver.  One source is the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).239  But could the APA be used to
enjoin violation of an assimilated criminal statute?  It is not un-
heard of for the federal government to be held liable for viola-
ting the APA’s prohibition on agency action that is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”240  Famous examples under the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act abound.241  However, issues of discretion242 and final agency
action243 are likely to come up.
Further, even if someone were to bring a challenge under the
APA, there remains the question of the appropriate remedy.  Be-
cause only the criminal and not the civil provisions of a state law
are assimilated under the ACA, the court would have to enjoin
the criminal activity.  Enjoining criminal activity is something
that courts have not traditionally done.244  However, unlike pre-
vious cases where the government was seeking to enjoin private
action, here, the situation is such that a group which cannot re-
sort to prosecution, is seeking to enjoin actions by the govern-
ment which authorized criminal activity without any authority.
Therefore, the traditional rationale for not issuing an injunction
for criminal activity may not seem so persuasive.
If the federal government is concerned about its ability to use
its property without restrictions from state endangered species, it
238 Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 1426, 1435 (9th Cir. 1996).
239 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006).
240 Id.  § 706(2)(a).
241 See, e.g. , Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); Humane
Soc’y of the U.S. v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Newton County Wild-
life Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v.
Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
242 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
243 Id.  § 704.
244 See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.
1982).
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has an easy solution: list them.  The preclusive effect on assimila-
tion is just one of the benefits of listing a species under the fed-
eral ESA.  Further, the federal government would finally be
living up to its stewardship responsibility.
In the alternative, the take prohibitions found in many state
endangered species acts may be applied on certain federal lands.
These prohibitions are incorporated as federal law and as such
may even be enforceable by private groups and state attorneys
general against the federal government.  Hopefully, this alterna-
tive will prove fruitful in protecting species in areas that other-
wise might not be protected, whether the federal government
steps up to do so or whether citizens have to find a way to en-
force their own laws.  The ongoing threats to wildlife in the
twenty-first century surely demonstrate that ignoring the prob-
lem will not make it go away.
